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The state of resource taxation in Australia:
`An inexcusable folly for the nation'?
{
Rob Fraser*
This article discusses the principal claims made for the Resource Rent Tax (RRT)
by Garnaut and Clunies-Ross (1975, 1979) relating to its e¤ciency and potential
for generating tax revenue relative to other forms of resource taxation, and also
their concern about the greater uncertainty of these revenues. An analysis of the
risk-return trade-o¡ associated with a shift from ad valorem royalties to an RRT
¢nds this shift to be worthwhile. Estimates are also provided of the foregone tax
revenue from the North West Shelf associated with the use of ad valorem royalties
rather than the RRT.
1. Introduction
The quote in the sub-title of this article is taken from a powerful critique
by Craig Emerson and Peter Lloyd of the Australian resource taxation
system published in the Economic Record in 1983. This was also the year of
¢rst election of the Hawke Labor government, an Australian federal
government which made a determined e¡ort, largely unsuccessfully in my
view, to address the concerns with this system described in Emerson and
Lloyd.
1
These concerns were of two main types:
1. The base used to tax resources was typically either volume or value
(speci¢c or ad valorem), both of which were seen to be inferior relative
to the `optimal' base of economic pro¢t identi¢ed by the academic
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2. The essentially state-based system of resource taxation was seen to be
vulnerable to disharmony in the treatment of individual resources, and
competition among the states in attracting resource development.
The Hawke government's attempt to deal with the second type of concern
centred on a uni¢cation of the system of resource taxation at the federal
level, and failed. This only left it the Australian territorial waters as a
domain for improving the tax base and, in connection with this, the
Petroleum Resource Rent Tax (PRRT) was introduced in 1987. This tax is
essentially an operational form of the Resource Rent Tax (RRT) proposed
by Garnaut and Clunies-Ross.
In this article I will be focusing on the claims made for the RRT by
Garnaut and Clunies-Ross, including an empirical assessment of the
performance of the PRRT relative to other forms of resource taxation. In so
doing, I will be attempting to answer the question posed in the title.
The structure of the article is as follows. In section 2 I will outline the
essential features of the RRT, including a brief discussion of the two
principal claims for the RRT made by Garnaut and Clunies-Ross.
Speci¢cally that:
1. it `appears to do less to reduce e¤ciency in the use of resources than
alternative taxation systems' (1975, p. 272); and
2. it `can secure for the government a higher proportion of supernormal
pro¢ts from each resource than most other taxation systems' (1975,
p. 272).
In addition, I will discuss one of Garnaut and Clunies-Ross' principal
caveats to the superiority of the RRT, that `the greater expected revenue
would be achieved at the expense of greater uncertainty about receipts'
(1975, p. 282).
In subsequent sections I will examine each of these issues in greater
detail. In the third section I examine the issue of whether other forms of
resource taxation, such as the commonly used ad valorem royalty, do
actually have `a disincentive e¡ect on production' (Emerson and Lloyd
1983, p. 240). Drawing on Fraser and Rygnestad (1999), I will argue that
in certain circumstances, and in particular where trade is best characterised
by a form of bilateral monopoly, ad valorem royalties are unlikely to be a
disincentive to production, and may in fact be a stimulus. Consequently, in
2Note that Craig Emerson's PhD was completed at the Australian National University,
where both Ross Garnaut and Peter Lloyd were academics at the time.
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a typical royalty system. In the fourth section I consider both the second
claim of Garnaut and Clunies-Ross regarding the superiority of the RRT in
terms of expected tax revenue, and their caveat to this superiority regarding
the greater uncertainty of such revenue. In particular, I explore the evidence
to date regarding the performance not just of the PRRT, but also of the
Resource Rent Royalty (RRR) jointly applied by the Western Australian
(WA) and Australian governments to Barrow Island petroleum since 1985,
relative to the ad valorem royalty system applied to petroleum from the
North-West Shelf (NWS).
3 This exploration will support the conjectures of
Garnaut and Clunies-Ross, and so in the ¢fth section I consider whether
the risk-return trade-o¡ associated with a shift from ad valorem taxation to
an RRT is worthwhile. My analysis in this section supports the view that
the trade-o¡ is worthwhile, and in so doing I provide estimates of the
magnitude of our nation's `inexcusable folly' in relation to resource
taxation.
The ¢nal section turns to what is in my view the most justi¢able concern
with the adoption of the RRT form of resource taxation: its vulnerability
to rorting. Here I make use of the literature of the economics of regulation
to draw parallels (¢rst identi¢ed by Garnaut and Clunies-Ross 1979)
between the RRT and rate-of-return regulation. In so doing, I will focus on
the major weakness in rate-of-return regulation which inspired the
development of the now-popular price-cap regulation, and suggest a means
of modifying the RRT so that it captures for this resource taxation system
the essential strength of the innovation represented by price-cap
regulation.
2. Essential features of the RRT
The essential features of the RRT as developed by Garnaut and Clunies-
Ross are:
1. a focus on pro¢ts by allowing certain costs to be deducted from
revenues in determining tax liability;
2. a threshold rate-of-return on capital as a component of allowable cost
deductions;
3. a marginal rate of tax which applies to pro¢ts in excess of those
consistent with the allowable rate-of-return on capital.
3Apart from the pro¢t-based taxes applied to mining in the Northern Territory, I am
not aware of any other pro¢t-based resource taxation in Australia (Northern Territory
Treasury 1992).
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px ÿ ck=k < r 1
where:
p  price per unit of extracted resource
x  units of extracted resource
c  operating costs per unit of capital
k  units of capital
r  threshold rate of return.
But if:
px ÿ ck=k > r 2
then tax paid is given by:
tpx ÿ c  rk: 3
On this basis, pro¢t in the presence of the RRT is given by:
p  px ÿ ck if px ÿ ck=k  r
p  px ÿ ck ÿ tpx ÿ c  rk if px ÿ ck=k > r:
4
This pro¢t function is clearly kinked at the level rk. Moreover, as
demonstrated in Fraser (1999), when compared with an ad valorem royalty
designed to yield the same level of expected tax revenue, the distorting
impact on production of the RRT is unambiguously smaller than that of the
ad valorem royalty. This feature of appearing `to do less to reduce e¤ciency'
can be traced to the kink, in so far as the ¢rm's pro¢t function below the
kink is completely una¡ected by the presence of the tax, unlike the case
of the ad valorem royalty which reduces all feasible pro¢t outcomes (see
¢gure 1).
4 And in fact, depending on the speci¢cation of the ¢rm's economic
circumstances, the RRT can be shown to have two separate positive impacts
on the optimal production decision. The ¢rst of these, analysed in Fraser
(1993) following its identi¢cation in Garnaut and Clunies-Ross (1979), stems
from the opportunity to decrease the likelihood of having to pay tax by
increasing the level of optimal investment, and thereby decreasing all feasible
rates-of-return. This is the version of the Averch-Johnson e¡ect which
applies to the RRT (Averch and Johnson 1962). The second, analysed in
Fraser (1998) but also identi¢ed in Garnaut and Clunies-Ross (1975), stems
from the risk-sharing quality of the RRT, by which means some of the
riskiness of pro¢t outcomes is transferred to the government to take the form
4For full details of the impact of the two tax systems on optimal decisions see Fraser
(1999).
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has a positive impact on its production decision.
Moreover, there is no need for a government simply to accept the relative
superiority of the RRT in terms of its distorting e¡ect on production. If
preferred, it can `trade' some of this superiority for `a higher proportion of
super-normal pro¢ts'. As shown in Fraser and Kingwell (1997), a simulated
comparison of the RRT with ad valorem royalties in the context of
investment-neutrality shows an unambiguous and in many cases substantial
superiority for the RRT in terms of the level of expected tax revenue.
Consequently, we argue that concern over the expected tax bene¢ts from
converting an ad valorem royalty system to the RRT cannot be used to
explain the reluctance of state governments in Australia to adopt the RRT
form of resource taxation.
5
However, Garnaut and Clunies-Ross (1975) did suggest that `the greater
expected revenue would be achieved at the expense of greater uncertainty
about receipts', and so it may be the existence of this trade-o¡ which is
inhibiting the adoption of the RRT form by state governments. In Fraser
(1999) I explore this issue in the context of the Western Australia gold
royalty. Based on simulations comparing the variability of tax revenues from
Figure 1 Impact of the RRT and royalties on pro¢t
5This issue is developed further in Fraser (1998b).
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of tax revenue-neutrality as a benchmark, I show that the coe¤cient of
variation of tax revenue varies from about 30 per cent for the ad valorem
royalty, to over 80 per cent for the RRT.
6
On the basis of this research, the ¢rst question in my mind is whether such
di¡erences which arise in simulated situations also manifest themselves in
the actual performance of the operational forms of the two tax systems.
And, on the basis of estimates of the risk-return trade-o¡ associated with
changing tax systems, the second question is whether this trade-o¡ is
worthwhile. As stated in the Introduction, I address these issues in sections 4
and 5, respectively, after ¢rst addressing in more detail the issue of the
distorting e¡ect of royalties in section 3.
3. The disincentive effect of royalties
The previous discussion, and the resource taxation literature in general, have
supported the view that (ad valorem and speci¢c) royalties are an inferior
form of resource taxation partly because of their disincentive e¡ect on
production. In this section I summarise brie£y the argument of Fraser and
Rygnestad (1999) which endeavours to qualify this view. In particular, we
argue that in a trading situation best characterised by the bilateral monopoly
model, the imposition of royalties may actually increase the quantities of
resource traded. Since it has been suggested by Smith (1977), Bowen and
Gooday (1993) and Chang and Sheales (1993) that such a characterisation
can be applied to the trading situation between Australia and Japan for coal
and iron ore, and since coal and iron ore are both subject to royalty regimes
and are two of Australia's four largest export earners (1997^98: coal
approximately A$9 billion; iron ore approximately A$4 billion), this
argument would appear to be of some signi¢cance.
7
In this context, consider ¢gures 2 and 3 which reproduce ¢gures 3 and 4,
respectively, of Fraser and Rygnestad (1999). These ¢gures represent two
distinct forms of the bilateral monopoly model. In the case of Form 1
(¢gure 2), the seller's marginal cost function (mc) and its associated
marginal factor cost function (mfc) rise relatively sharply (in the region of
the bargain). As a consequence, the preferred position of the seller in the
absence of royalties (B) is characterised by a higher price and a higher
6Although in the appendix I show that there are situations where this `expense of greater
uncertainty' is very small or even negative.
7The other two are gold (approximately A$5 billion) and wool (approximately A$4
billion). Note that 75 per cent of gold is mined in Western Australia, and was subject to a
royalty as of July 1998.
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Figure 3 Bilateral monopoly with royalties: Form 2
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used as a simpli¢cation to represent the set of feasible outcomes of the
bargaining process, is positively sloped. By contrast, in the case of Form 2
(¢gure 3), the mc (and its associated mfc) rise relatively slowly. As a
consequence, the preferred position of the seller (Y) is characterised by a
higher price and a lower quantity relative to that of the buyer (X), and the
line XY is negatively sloped. Note that, in the absence of royalties, the
outcome of the bargaining process in each case has been speci¢ed as the mid-
point of the lines of feasible outcomes: M in the case of Form 1; and W in
the case of Form 2.
Now consider the impact of the imposition of royalties. In each case this
causes a downward shift in the marginal revenue curve of the seller (from MR
to MRR), which shifts the preferred position of the seller further up the
demand curve (to BR for Form 1 and YR for Form 2), and thereby rotates
anti-clockwise the lines of feasible outcomes (to ABR for Form 1 and XYR for
Form 2). In the absence of any change in the relative bargaining power of
the buyer and the seller, the new positions of agreement would be represented
by MR in the case of Form 1, and WR in the case of Form 2. However, the
argument made in Fraser and Rygnestad (1999) is that the imposition of a
royalty will modify the relative bargaining power of the buyer and the seller.
In particular, it is suggested that `the new requirement for the seller to bear
the ¢nancial burden of royalty payments will weaken its ¢nancial position and
therefore weaken its bargaining power' (p. 4). Accepting this argument implies
a new position of agreement which is closer to the preferred position of the
buyer (A in the case of Form 1 and X in the case of Form 2). For illustrative
purposes these new positions have been represented as N and Z in ¢gures 2
and 3, respectively. In the case of Form 1 it can be seen that taking account of
the impact of the royalty on relative bargaining power serves to reinforce the
initial tendency for the royalty to decrease the quantity traded (from QM to
Q
R
M to QN). However, in the case of Form 2 this impact on relative bargaining
power creates a con£icting tendency for an increase in quantity traded,
which for the example of Z has been chosen to dominate the initial
decreasing tendency (from QW to Q
R
W to QZ).
As a consequence of this argument, we conclude that in the case of
Form 2 of the bilateral monopoly model `royalties can have an overall
positive impact on production if the royalties induce a strong enough shift in
the balance of bargaining power towards the buyer' (Fraser and Rygnestad
1999, p. 5). But more generally, we conclude that `the analysis of Form 2 of
the bilateral monopoly model does not support the view that royalties
decrease production' (ibid., p. 5).
Subsequent research reported in Fraser and Rygnestad (1999) includes
evidence to support the view that the iron ore trade between Australia and
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Consequently, we suggest that in this situation there is no e¤ciency
argument to favour an RRT over the existing royalty system.
4. The expected level and variability of tax revenue
In this section I explore the evidence to date regarding the performance of
the PRRT since its introduction in 1987. To supplement this evidence I
include comparison data on the performance of both the Resource Rent
Royalty (RRR) jointly applied (25 per cent/75 per cent) by the Western
Australian and Australian governments to Barrow Island petroleum since
1986 and the ad valorem royalty jointly applied (40 per cent/60 per cent) by
these governments to petroleum from the NWS. Table 1 contains data on
production, total tax revenue and tax revenue per barrel for the three
petroleum tax systems since 1987. In what follows, comparisons are made
focusing on the derived measure of tax revenue per barrel as this eliminates
in particular the distorting impact on total tax revenue of the rapid
development of NWS production in the last decade.
In this context, table 2 contains summary measures of the mean, standard
deviation and coe¤cient of variation for the three petroleum tax systems. Note
that table 2 contains two sets of summary measures for the PRRT. PRRT(10)
refers to the values calculated using the ten data points for the PRRT in table
1. However, it can be seen from this table that the ¢rst two data points (1988,
Table 1 Data for the three petroleum tax systems














1988 210.14 6.27 30.09 0 57.87 36.60 0 9.23 1.22
1989 192.42 5.77 31.69 0 23.90 35.16 0 4.14 1.11
1990 219.38 5.42 55.85 42 45.49 97.94 0.19 8.39 1.75
1991 213.49 5.26 68.98 293 36.88 203.14 1.37 7.02 2.94
1992 218.22 5.32 76.30 876 32.58 192.28 4.01 6.12 2.52
1993 212.18 5.21 83.36 1389 25.93 177.84 6.55 4.98 2.13
1994 200.95 5.40 95.03 1072 29.26 239.63 5.33 5.42 2.52
1995 221.39 5.28 108.94 865 19.58 261.57 3.91 3.71 2.40
1996 191.81 4.98 140.43 791 9.84 431.22 4.12 1.97 3.07
1997 175.44 6.73 158.16 1310 16.72 558.41 7.47 2.48 3.53
Sources:
a Commonwealth Department of Primary Industries and Energy (1998) Petroleum Production
Statistics, Petroleum and Fisheries Division, Canberra.
b CommonwealthBudgetPapers(1997)RevenueStatistics1985/86^1996/97,Vol.I,Canberra.
c WA Department of Minerals and Energy (various years) Barrow Island Royalty Trust
Account Annual Reports, Perth.
d WA State Budget Papers (various years) Estimates of Revenue and Expenditure, Perth.
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of deductible costs over revenues for those two years, as well as to a large
extent for the third and fourth years. Although this pattern of tax revenue from
the PRRT is an appropriate feature of the system in its early years, and is an
important contributor to the perceived riskiness of revenues from such a
system, in my view the brevity of the data period means that this feature is
arguably of exaggerated importance in estimating the mean and standard
deviation of tax revenue from the PRRT. Consequently, I have included
PRRT(25) in table 2, which represents a recalculation of the estimates
including each of the last ¢ve data points (1993^97) three more times, with the
intention of producing a set of summary measures which is less a¡ected by
the start-up features of the PRRT.
8 It can be seen that the outcome of this
recalculation is a set of estimates for the PRRT which is closer to those for the
RRR. Given that the RRR was introduced for an existing mine, thereby
excluding such features from its data series, it is my view that PRRT(25) is a
superior description of the performance of the PRRT to PRRT(10). Note also
that the tax revenue data from which the summary measures are generated
apply to di¡erent physical locations for petroleum. Consequently, the
possibility exists that speci¢c `¢eld' characteristics may be in£uencing the
perceived di¡erences between the revenue streams of the various tax systems.
For example, variations in product quality in one location may lead to price
variation which is not apparent in another location. In what follows it is
assumed that the `¢eld' characteristics of the locations in question are
su¤ciently homogeneous for their role in determining di¡erences in the
summary measures of the tax revenue streams to be negligible.
9




PRRT(10) 3.30 2.76 0.84
PRRT(25) 4.60 2.29 0.50
RRR 5.35 2.39 0.45
Ad valorem 2.32 0.79 0.34
Source: Table 1
8Note that, based on the data for the RRR, this period for a pro¢t-based tax
underestimates both the expected level and variability of receipts/bbl. Also, recall that,
because the ad valorem royalty is strictly proportional to total revenue, its receipts per
barrel are not a¡ected by the expansion of NWS production over this period.
9I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for clarifying this point for me. Moreover,
although I am not able to produce physical data to support this assumption, it should be
recognised that all three locations have the common characteristic of being o¡shore.
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for mean tax revenue are consistent with the claims of Garnaut and Clunies-
Ross (1975) for the RRT relative to other tax systems. Similarly, the results
for the standard deviation con¢rm that this `greater expected revenue [is]
achieved at the expense of greater uncertainty of receipts'. In particular,
mean tax revenue for PRRT(25) is almost double that for the ad valorem
system (4.60 compared with 2.32), but the standard deviation of tax revenue
is almost three times the size (2.29 compared with 0.79). Given this di¡erence
in proportions, the coe¤cient of variation for PRRT(25) is approximately
50 per cent larger than that for the ad valorem system.
However, having con¢rmed the conjectures of Garnaut and Clunies-Ross
(1975) for the RRT relative to an ad valorem system, the question remains
as to whether the risk-return trade-o¡ re£ected in the results in table 2
warrants a risk-averse government switching from an ad valorem to an
RRT-based system. This question is examined in the next section.
5. Evaluating the risk-return trade-off for switching tax systems
The standard approach in the literature for integrating the consideration of
risk and return is the method of expected utility (Newbury and Stiglitz
1981). Based on this method, risk-return trade-o¡s can be evaluated using a
second-order Taylor series expansion of the utility function, combined with a
particular functional form to represent utility (Fraser 1998a).
In the speci¢c context of a government collecting tax revenue T R, the
expected utility of tax revenue EUT R is represented by:




00ET R  VarT R 5












Based on this speci¢cation, table 3 reports details of the evaluation of the
risk-return tradeo¡s contained in table 2 for a range of values of the risk
aversion coe¤cient (R). In relation to these values, note that Indian peasant
farmers have been estimated to have values of R between 0.5 and 1.2
(Newbury and Stiglitz 1981), while estimated values for Australian farmers
are between 0.1 and 0.7 (Bardsley and Harris 1987). On this basis, I would
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government to be at the lower end of the range in table 3.
In addition, the results in table 3 have been presented as ratios of the
expected utility of tax revenue per barrel from one tax system relative to
another, with the three pro¢t-based sets of summary measures compared in
turn with those of the ad valorem system. In general, these results show that,
for all speci¢ed levels of risk aversion, a government's perception of the
expected utility from a pro¢t-based tax system would exceed that of the ad
valorem system. Moreover, this superiority applies even to the most
unfavourable of the sets of summary measures for a pro¢t-based system
(PRRT(10)). Based on previous comments, I think the most appropriate
result to focus on in table 3 is that for R  0:3 and PRRT(25), which shows
the expected utility per barrel from the PRRT exceeding that from the ad
valorem royalty by almost 60 per cent.
10
As an extension of these results, recall that the WA government receives
40 per cent of tax receipts from the ad valorem system applying to the NWS,
whereas it receives only 25 per cent of tax receipts from the RRR applying
to Barrow Island. Although this di¡erence raises the possibility that for the
Western Australian government its expected utility of tax receipts per barrel
from the NWS exceeds that from Barrow Island, row 1 of table 4 con¢rms
that this is not the case. Moreover, row 2 shows that the WA government's
share of tax receipts per barrel from the NWS would have to increase to well
above 50 per cent (compared with 25 per cent from Barrow Island) before

















10Note that using the constant relative risk aversion form for the utility functions means
that scale (number of barrels) is not a factor determining these results.
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Needless to say, the Australian government's view of the relative expected
utility is even more strongly in favour of the Barrow Island arrangement (for
R  0:3, the EUT R ratio is 2.08).
Finally in this section, consider the extent to which average ad valorem
tax receipts from the NWS would have to increase for the perceived bene¢ts
from this tax system to equal those from the PRRT. Speci¢cally, table 5
contains results based on the level of average tax revenue per barrel from the
NWS which, for the same coe¤cient of variation of these receipts, just
equates the expected utility of tax revenue per barrel between the two
systems. Note that these results are evaluated only for R  0:3, and for 1997
production from the NWS.
These results suggest that, compared with the expected utility-neutral
application of the ad valorem system to the NWS, the average annual tax
receipts from the existing ad valorem system are more than $100m lower,
and are arguably between $300m and $400m lower.
11 An inexcusable folly
for the nation? I think so.
Table 4 Evaluation of the Western Australian government's risk-return trade-off
R
0.3 0.6 0.9
(1) EUT R Ratio:
RRR(25 per cent)/
Ad valorem (40 per cent)
1.28 1.15 1.03
(2) Balancing ad valorem share (per cent) 57.0 56.3 55.6
Table 5 Required increase in NWS tax receipts to balance









a Based on R  0:3
b Based on 1997 NWS production  158 Mbbl
11The component mix of petroleum from the NWS di¡ers from those regions where the
PRRT is applied, with a much higher weight for natural gas. If natural gas is more pro¢table
to produce than other forms of petroleum, then the values in table 5 are underestimated.
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Apart from the comments I made in section 3 regarding e¤ciency, this article
has ostensibly been an exercise in validating the characteristics of the RRT
asserted by Garnaut and Clunies-Ross (see section 2). In particular, on the
basis of evidence relating to the performance of the PRRT and the RRR, I
have shown that an RRT can be expected to yield higher average tax
revenues, albeit at the expense of greater variability of those revenues, than
an ad valorem tax system (section 4). Nevertheless, for reasonable levels of
risk aversion, the risk-return trade-o¡ associated with switching from ad
valorem royalties to an RRT is well worthwhile (section 5).
I would like to conclude by focusing on one concern with the RRT which
was mentioned only brie£y by Garnaut and Clunies-Ross (1975), but then
commented on in greater detail by Garnaut and Clunies-Ross (1979).
This concern relates to the theoretical connection between rate-of-return
regulation and the RRT. Speci¢cally, in the 1975 paper they note in passing
that `the marginal rate [of tax] would, of course, need to be kept signi¢cantly
below 100 per cent to maintain company interest in the e¤cient management
of the project' (p. 281). However, in the 1979 paper they make the explicit
connection that `a 100 per cent rate would be equivalent to the absolute rate-
of-return regulations whose distorting e¡ects are described by Averch and
Johnson (1962)' (p. 196). These distorting e¡ects relate to an incentive for
over-capitalisation, or `gold-plating', in order to reduce the ¢rm's actual rate
of return on capital relative to the critical rate at which tax (or a rebate in
the case of rate-of-return regulation) becomes payable. Any manifestation of
this incentive in actual investment behaviour will result in overall tax receipts
being lower than they would be otherwise. Moreover, concern over this
feature may be an explanation for the reluctance of state governments in
Australia to embrace the RRT. Evidence to support this conjecture is
provided by the actions of the Northern Territory government, which in its
broad range of pro¢t-based resource taxes has paid particular attention to
allowable capital costs in the form of its `Capital Recognition Deduction'
(Northern Territory Treasury 1992).
What is clear from the economic literature is that disa¡ection with the
rate-of-return method of regulation, and in particular its in-built incentive
for over-capitalisation, prompted the development of the RPI-X form of
regulation, ¢rst applied to the privatised BT in 1984, and now widely applied
in situations of privatised monopoly power and referred to as price-cap
regulation (Fraser 1991, 1996). The essential feature of price-cap regulation
is its focus on price rather than pro¢t (as in rate-of-return regulation). In
particular, a price-cap regulated ¢rm is constrained to increase its price (or
weighted sum of prices) by no more than the in£ation rate less an adjustment
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limit to the pro¢ts which such a ¢rm can earn. Consequently, ¢rms subject to
price-cap regulation have no incentive to over-capitalisation, and in fact have
every incentive to cost e¤ciencies because of the absence of a constraint on
pro¢ts.
Given the development of the price-cap method in regulation policy, and
given the connection between the RRT and the (denounced) method of rate-
of-return regulation, is there some way of utilising this development in
regulation policy to deal with the incentive to over-capitalisation in the
context of the RRT?
I think there is, but the modi¢cation to the RRT needs to take account
of the shift in focus from ¢rms with monopoly power to ¢rms without. In
particular, I suggest an associated shift in focus from a price-cap to a cost-
cap. The RRT, as it stands, is a tax on pro¢ts, where the ¢rm has both the
opportunity and the incentive to cost ine¤ciencies. But, if in the
establishment of the operational form of the RRT, the government and the
¢rm negotiated an agreement over the allowable cost (its `cost-cap') per unit
of production (subject to an in£ation clause), then not only would the
government eliminate an element of variability in its £ow of tax revenues,
but also the ¢rm would know that pro¢ts generated by cost reductions
relative to its `cost-cap' would be untaxed.
12
In E.M. Forster's Howards End Margaret Schlegel urges us to `only
connect' (1910, p. 174). I look forward to the time when my RRT
`connection' to recent developments in regulation policy will justify its
literary pretensions.
APPENDIX: On the `expense of greater uncertainty about receipts' of the RRT
The aim in this appendix is to demonstrate that the `expense' of the RRT, in terms
of its greater variability of tax revenues relative to other resource tax systems,
may in certain circumstances be very small, or even negative. In particular, it is
shown that if a ¢rm's price and cost of production exhibit a strong enough positive
correlation, then the variability of tax revenues from a pro¢ts-based tax is less than
that of an ad valorem tax with an equivalent level of expected tax revenue. Since
¢rms with high export and import pro¢les in their revenues and costs (respectively)
will feature such a positive correlation in the presence of exchange rate
£uctuations, and since ¢rms with such pro¢les are common in the resource sector,
I would argue this demonstration is of considerable relevance to state governments
contemplating a switch from an ad valorem system to an RRT.
12Recall that in the appendix it is shown that a positive covariance between prices and
costs, even if only based on similar in£ationary (e.g. exchange rate) causes, is a stabiliser of
pro¢ts and therefore of tax revenues for an RRT.
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price p and uncertain cost of output cq:
p  pq ÿ cq: A1
Its objective is to maximise the expected utility of pro¢t EUp by the choice






00Ep  Varp: A2
The ¢rm's expected pro¢t Ep and variance of pro¢t (Varp) will depend on
the type of tax regime it faces. In the case of an ad valorem royalty v on the value
of production:
Epv  1 ÿ vpq ÿ Ecq A3
Varpv  q
21 ÿ v
2Varp  Varcq ÿ 21 ÿ vq covp;cq A4
where:
p  expected price per unit of output
Ecq  expected cost of output
Varp  variance of price
Varcq  variance of cost of output
covp;cq  covariance of price and cost of output.
In this case, the government's expected tax revenue ET RV and variance of tax
revenue (VarT RV are given by:
ET RV  vpq A5
VarT RV  v
2q
2Varp: A6
For a pro¢ts-based tax t, the corresponding equations are:
Ept  1 ÿ tpq ÿ Ecq A7
Varpt  1 ÿ t
2q
2Varp  Varcq ÿ 2q covp;cq A8
ET Rt  tpq ÿ Ecq A9
VarT Rt  t
2q
2Varp  Varcq ÿ 2q covp;cq: A10
In each case the ¢rm's optimal level of output is found by di¡erentiating equation





















where the associated derivatives for each tax system are given by:
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In order to compare numerically the performance of each of these tax systems I




x  known increasing marginal cost parameter x > 1
c  random parameter
c  expected value of c



















sp  standard deviation of p
sc  standard deviation of c,
it follows that:
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with R  0:5:
Table A1 contains details of the results of a numerical analysis where the extent
of the variability of costs sc, and the strength of the positive correlation between
price and costs r have been varied to illustrate possible outcomes for the
government. In addition, the rate of tax for the pro¢t-based tax system t has been
chosen to achieve expected tax revenue-neutrality between the two systems.
The results in this table (see columns 1, 2, 3 and 4) show that if, for a given level
of cost variability sc  12:5, the positive correlation between price and costs is
strong enough r  0:9, then an expected tax revenue-neutral switch from an ad
valorem to a pro¢t-based tax system will both increase the production level and
the expected utility of pro¢t for the ¢rm, and decrease the variability of the
government's tax revenues. It follows that with a small increase in the rate of its
pro¢t tax, the government could create a situation where the switch from the ad
valorem system would improve e¤ciency, increase the ¢rm's expected utility,
increase the government's expected tax revenue and decrease the variability of this
revenue!
Table A1 Numerical analysis of the two tax systems
r  0:7 r  0:9 r  0:9
















q 1.44 1.51 1.57 1.64 1.38 1.44
Ep 96.80 98.31 97.88 98.29 95.50 97.45
Varp 11056.44 11405.85 9123.99 9204.15 12376.25 12889.86
EUp 16.78 16.91 17.43 17.47 16.23 16.39
ET R 14.41 14.41 15.68 15.68 13.75 13.75
VarT R 207.60 244.45 245.71 233.54 189.05 256.03
Notes:
a t  0:128
b t  0:137
c t  0:123
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not only on the strength of the positive correlation between price and costs, but
also on the level of cost variability.
Nevertheless, it can be concluded from the results in table A1 that the existence
of a strong positive correlation between price and costs creates a situation where
the di¡erence between the variability of tax revenue under an ad valorem and a
pro¢t-based tax system may be very small, or even negative.
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